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Abstract
This paper studies specifications and proofs of distributed algorithms when only
message history variables are used, using the Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos algorithms
for distributed consensus as precise case studies. We show that not using and main-
taining other state variables yields simpler specifications that are more declarative and
easier to understand. It also allows easier proofs to be developed by needing fewer
invariants and facilitating proof derivations. Furthermore, the proofs are mechanically
checked more efficiently.
We show that specifications in TLA+, Lamport’s temporal logic of actions, and
proofs in TLAPS, the TLA+ Proof System (TLAPS) are reduced by a quarter or more
for single-value Paxos and by about half or more for multi-value Paxos. Overall we
need about half as many manually written invariants and proof obligations. Our proof
for Basic Paxos takes about 25% less time for TLAPS to check, and our proofs for
Multi-Paxos are checked within 1.5 minutes whereas prior proofs fail to be checked by
TLAPS.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about correctness of distributed algorithms is notoriously difficult due to a number
of reasons including concurrency, asynchronous networks, and failures. Emerging technolo-
gies such as autonomous cars are bringing vehicular clouds closer to reality [13]; decentralized
digital currencies are gathering more attention from academia and industry than ever [42];
and with the explosion in the number of nano- and pico- satellites being launched, a similar
trend is expected in the field of space exploration [40]. All of these systems deal with critical
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resources such as human life, currency, and intricate machinery. This only amplifies the need
for employing formal methods to guarantee their correctness.
Verification of distributed algorithms continues to pose a demanding challenge to com-
puter scientists, exacerbated by the fact that paper proofs of these algorithms cannot be
trusted [45]. The usual line of reasoning in static analysis of such systems involves manually
writing invariants and then using theorem provers to verify that the invariants follow from
the specification and that they imply correctness.
History variables and derived variables. A distributed system comprises a set of pro-
cesses communicating with each other by message passing while performing local actions
that may be triggered upon receiving a set of messages and may conclude with sending a
set of messages [17, 19]. As such, data processed by any distributed process fall into two
categories: (i) message history variables, or in short history variables: Sets of all messages
sent and received1 and (ii) derived variables: Local data maintained for efficient computa-
tion. Derived variables are often used to maintain results of aggregate queries over sent and
received messages.
Derived variables are helpful for efficient implementation because instead of computing
expensive queries from scratch as messages are sent and received, the variable is incremen-
tally updated to maintain the query result. While this approach works well for efficient
implementation, the same is not true for reasoning. For specifications written with derived
variables, invariants have to be added to their proofs which, at the very least, establish that
the derived variable holds the query result.
One reason to use derived variables in formal specifications is their existence in pseu-
docode and implementations. Another reason is the lack of high-level languages that provide
elegant support for quantifications, history variables, and automatic optimal maintenance of
aggregate queries over history variables. The barrier of lack of executable language support
for such expressiveness is overcome by high-level languages like DistAlgo [28], which provides
native support for history variables, quantifications, and aggregate queries. This motivated
us to dispense with derived variables, and study specifications written with only history
variables and the impact of this change on the proofs.
Note that uses of history variables provide higher-level specifications of systems in terms
of what to compute, as opposed to how to compute with employing and updating derived
variables. It makes proofs easier, independent of the logics used for doing the proofs, because
important invariants are captured directly in the specifications, rather than hidden under all
the incremental updates. On the other hand, it can make model checking much less efficient,
just as it can make straightforward execution much less efficient. This is not only because
high-level queries are time consuming, but also because maintaining history variables can
blow up the state space. This is why automatic incrementalization [37, 39, 14, 26] is essential
for efficient implementations, including implementations of distributed algorithms [29, 27].
The same transformations for incrementalization can drastically speed up both program
1This is different from some other references of the term history variables which include sequences of local
actions, i.e., execution history [9]
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execution and model checking.
This paper. We first describe a systematic style to write specifications of distributed
algorithms using message history variables. The only variables in these specifications are the
sets of sent and/or received messages. We show (i) how these are different from the usual
pseudocode, (ii) why these are sufficient for specifying all distributed algorithms, and (iii)
when these are better for the provers than other specifications. A method is then explained
which, given such specifications, leads us to systematically derive many important invariants
needed for correctness proofs. This method exploits the fact that the sets of sent and received
messages grow monotonically — messages can only be added or read from these sets, not
modified or deleted.
We use three algorithm variants already specified in TLA+, Lamport’s temporal logic of
actions [19], and proved using TLAPS, the TLA+ proof system as our case studies: (i) Basic
Paxos for single-valued consensus by Lamport et al. [25], (ii) Multi-Paxos for multi-value
consensus by Chand et al. [4], and (iii) Multi-Paxos with Preemption [4]. Paxos is chosen
because it is famous for being a difficult algorithm to grasp, while at the same time it is
the core algorithm for distributed consensus—the most fundamental problem in distributed
computing. We show that our approach led to significantly reduced sizes of specifications
and proofs, numbers of needed manually written invariants, and proof checking times. Our
specifications and proofs are available at https://github.com/Distalgo/proofs.
This paper is an extended and revised version of [3]. Besides overall revision and im-
provement, the main extensions are as follows:
1. Section 2 is extended with new Sections 2.3 and 2.4 introducing TLA+ and TLAPS,
respectively.
2. Section 4 is extended with new Section 4.4, describing the complete proof for Basic
Paxos.
3. Section 5, on specifications and proofs for Multi-Paxos, is almost entirely new, in-
stead of only a specification for preemption and a paragraph about verification in [3].
Section 5.1 explains and compares two approaches to developing Multi-Paxos speci-
fications that use only history variables. Section 5.2 presents a new specification of
preemption to use only history variable sent , not both sent and received . Section 5.3
and Section 5.4 describe all key invariants and changes for the proofs of Multi-Paxos
and Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
4. Complete simplified specification, invariants, and proof for Basic Paxos are given in
new Appendices A, B, and C, respectively.
5. Complete simplified specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption is given in new Ap-
pendix D. Complete simplified invariants used in the proofs for Multi-Paxos and Multi-
Paxos with Preemption are given in new Appendix E.
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6. New Appendix F shows the need of a specific condition in Lamport’s specification
for Basic Paxos for it to be safe, even though the condition is missing in the English
description in [20].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers preliminaries: distributed
consensus, Paxos, TLA+, and TLAPS. Section 3 details our style of writing specifications
using Basic Paxos as an example. Section 4 describes our strategy to systematically derive
invariants and how using history variables leads to needing fewer invariants. Section 5
explains approaches, specifications, invariants, and proofs for verifying Multi-Paxos and
Multi-Paxos with Preemption. Section 6 compares our specifications and proofs with those
that do not use history variables. Section 7 discusses related work and concludes.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Distributed consensus
A distributed system is a set of processes that process data locally and communicate with
each other by sending and receiving messages. The processes may crash and may later
recover, and the messages may be lost, delayed, reordered, and duplicated.
The basic consensus problem, called single-value consensus, is for a set of processes to
agree on a single value. An algorithm for single-value consensus is said to be safe if it satisfies
the following conditions [20]:
C1. Only a value that has been proposed may be chosen,
C2. Only a single value is chosen, and
C3. A process never learns that a value has been chosen unless it actually has been.
Following Lamport et al. [25] and Chand et al. [4], we consider only C2, also called Agreement .
Conditions C1 and C3 are straightforward and easy to prove. For Agreement , we formally
specify the following:
Agree , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V : Chosen(v1) ∧ Chosen(v2)⇒ v1 = v2 (1)
where V is the set of possible proposed values, and Chosen is a predicate that given a value
v evaluates to true iff v was chosen by the algorithm. The specification of Chosen is part of
the algorithm. The complete Agreement property is formally specified in (16).
The more general consensus problem, called multi-value consensus, is to agree on a se-
quence of values, instead of a single value. Here we have
Agreemulti , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V, s ∈ S : Chosen(s , v1) ∧ Chosen(s , v2)⇒ v1 = v2 (2)
where V is as above, S is a set of slots used to index the sequence of chosen values, and
Chosen(s , v) is true iff for slot s , value v was chosen by the algorithm.
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2.2 Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos
Paxos solves the problem of consensus. Two main roles of the algorithm are performed by
two kinds of processes:
• P, the set of proposers that propose values that can be chosen.
• A, the set of acceptors that vote for proposed values. A value is chosen when there are
enough votes for it.
These roles can be co-located, that is, a single process can take on more than one role.
A set Q of subsets of the acceptors, that is, Q ⊆ 2A, is used as a quorum system. It
must satisfy the property that any two quorums in Q overlap, that is, ∀Q1,Q2 ∈ Q :
Q1 ∩ Q2 6= ∅. The most commonly used quorum system Q takes any majority of acceptors
as an element in Q. For example, if A = {1, 2, 3}, then the majority based quorum set
is Q = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}}. Quorums are needed because the system can have
failures. If a process waits for replies from all other processes, the system will hang in the
presence of even one failed process. For example, in the system defined above, the system
will continue to work even if acceptor 3 fails because at least one quorum, which is {1, 2}, is
alive.
Basic Paxos solves the problem of single-value consensus. It defines predicate Chosen as
Chosen(v) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃ b ∈ B : sent(“2b”, a, b, v) (3)
where B is the set of proposal numbers, also called ballot numbers, which is any set that can
be totally ordered. sent(“2b”, a, b, v) means that a message of type 2b with ballot number
b and value v was sent by acceptor a. An acceptor votes (for value v) by sending such a
message.
Multi-Paxos solves the problem of multi-value consensus. It extends predicate Chosen
to decide a value for each slot s in S:
Chosen(s , v) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃ b ∈ B : sent(“2b”, a, b, s , v) (4)
To satisfy the Agreemulti property, S can be any set. In practice, S is usually the set of
natural numbers. Multi-Paxos can be built from Basic Paxos by carefully adding slots as
described in [4].
2.3 TLA+
The specifications presented in this article are written in the language TLA+, Lamport’s
temporal logic of actions [19, 21, 32, 31], a logic for specifying concurrent and distributed
systems and reasoning about their properties. In TLA+, a state is an assignment of values
to the variables. An action is a relation between a current state and a new state, specifying
the effect of executing a sequence of instructions. For example, the instruction x := x + 1 is
specified in TLA+ by the action x ′ = x+1. An action is specified as a formula over unprimed
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and primed variables, where unprimed variables refer to the values of the variables in the
current state, and primed variables refer to the values of the variables in the new state.
A system is specified by its actions and initial states. Formally, a system is specified as
Spec , Init∧✷[Next ]vars where Init is a predicate that holds for initial states of the system,
Next is a disjunction of all actions of the system, and vars is the tuple of all variables. The
expression [Next ]vars is true if either Next is true, implying some action is true and therefore
executed, or vars stutters, that is, the values of the variables are same in the current and
next states. ✷ is the temporal operator always. Thus, Spec defines a set of infinite sequences
of steps where in each step either an action is executed or vars stutters. Such a sequence is
called a behavior.
As a simple example, consider the following specification of a clock based on Lamport’s
logical clock [18] but on a shared memory system:
variable c
Max (S ) , choose e ∈ S : ∀ f ∈ S : e ≥ f
Init , c = [p ∈ {0, 1} 7→ 0]
LocalEvent(p) , c ′ = [c except ![p] = c[p] + 1]
ReceiveEvent(p) , c ′ = [c except ![p] = Max ({c[p], c[1− p]}) + 1]
Next , ∃ p ∈ {0, 1} : LocalEvent(p) ∨ ReceiveEvent(p)
Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]〈c 〉
(5)
The system has two processes numbered 0 and 1. Variable c stores their current clock
values as a function from process numbers to clock values. Both processes start with clock
value 0, as specified in Init . LocalEvent(p) specifies that process p has executed some local
action and therefore increments its clock value. The expression c ′ = [c except ![p] =
c[p] + 1] means that function c ′ is the same as function c except that c ′[p] is c[p] + 1.
ReceiveEvent(p) specifies that process p updates its clock value to 1 greater than the higher
of its and the other process’ clock value. We define operator Max to obtain the highest
of a set of values. choose returns an arbitrarily chosen value satisfying the body of the
choose expression if one exists, or an arbitrary value otherwise.
2.4 TLAPS
TLAPS, the TLA+ Proof System [6, 11, 2], is a tool for mechanically checking proofs of
properties of systems specified in TLA+. Proofs are written in a hierarchical style [22], and
are transformed to individual proof obligations that are sent to backend theorem provers.
An obligation is a logical formula of the form P ⇒ Q . For proving an obligation, the default
behaviour of TLAPS is to try three backend provers in succession: CVC3 (an SMT solver),
Zenon, and Isabelle [34, 33, 38]. If none of them finds a proof, TLAPS reports a failure on the
obligation. Other SMT solvers supported by TLAPS are Z3, veriT, and Yices. Temporal
formulas are proved using LS4, a propositional temporal logic (PTL) prover. Users can
specify which prover they want to use by using its name and can specify the timeout for
each obligation separately.
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As an example, we present the proof of a simple type invariant about the clock speci-
fication in (5)—it is always the case that c ∈ [{0, 1} → N], where N is the set of natural
numbers:
TypeOK , c ∈ [{0, 1} → N]
theorem Inv , Spec ⇒ ✷(TypeOK )
〈1〉.use def TypeOK
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ TypeOK by def Init
〈1〉2.TypeOK ∧ [Next ]〈c 〉 ⇒ TypeOK
′
〈2〉.assume TypeOK , [Next ]〈c 〉 prove TypeOK
′
〈2〉1.case ∃ p ∈ {0, 1} : LocalEvent(p)by 〈2〉1def LocalEvent
〈2〉2.case ∃ p ∈ {0, 1} : ReceiveEvent(p)by 〈2〉2def ReceiveEvent
〈2〉3.case unchanged 〈c 〉by 〈2〉3
〈2〉.qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3def Next
〈1〉.qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTLdef Spec
(6)
The proof of theorem Inv is written in a step-by-step fashion. It is proved by two steps,
named 〈1〉1 and 〈1〉2, and the PTL solver. Proof steps in TLAPS are typically written as:
〈x 〉y . Assertion by e1, . . . , em def d1, . . . , dn (7)
which states that step number 〈x 〉y proves Assertion by using e1, . . . , em , and expanding
the definitions of d1, . . . , dn . For example, step 〈1〉1 proves Init ⇒ TypeOK by expanding
the definition of Init . If TLAPS does not know if e i is true, it would try to prove e i using
e1, . . . , e i−1 and the current context. If TLAPS is unable to prove e i , it would display both e i
and Assertion as failed obligations. The step “〈1〉. use def TypeOK ” instructs the prover
to expand the definition of TypeOK in all proof steps till the qed step for 〈1〉. The qed step
for 〈1〉 instructs TLAPS to invoke a PTL prover because Inv is a temporal formula.
To demonstrate the hierarchical proof style advocated in TLAPS, we break down the
proof of step 〈1〉2. The step “〈2〉assume . . .prove ” specifies the assumptions and goal to
be proved in the current proof level, which is level 2. The next two steps 〈2〉1 and 〈2〉2 prove
the goal for the two actions specified in Next . Finally, 〈2〉3 proves the goal for the case of
stuttering. Together, 〈2〉1–3 cover all cases of [Next ]〈c 〉, thus concluding the proof.
3 Specifications using message history variables
We demonstrate our approach by developing a specification of Basic Paxos in which we only
maintain the set of sent messages. This specification is made to correspond to the specifica-
tion of Basic Paxos in TLA+ by Lamport et al. [25]. This is done to better understand the
applicability of our approach. We also simultaneously show Lamport’s description of the al-
gorithm in English [20] to aid the comparison, except we rename message types and variable
7
Phase 1a. A proposer selects a proposal number b and sends a 1a request
with number b to a majority of acceptors.
Lamport et al.’s Using sent only
Phase1a(b ∈ B) ,
∧∄m ∈ sent : (m.type = “1a”) ∧ (m.bal = b)
∧Send([type 7→ “1a”, bal 7→ b])
∧unchanged 〈maxVBal ,maxBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase1a(b ∈ B) ,
Send([type 7→ “1a”, bal 7→ b])
Figure 1: Specifications of Phase 1a of Basic Paxos
names to match those in Lamport et al.’s TLA+ specification: prepare and accept messages
are renamed 1a and 2a, respectively, their responses are renamed 1b and 2b, respectively,
and variable n is renamed b and bal in different places.
Basic Paxos variables. Lamport et al.’s specification of Basic Paxos has four global
variables.
• msgs: history variable maintaining the set of messages that have been sent. Processes
read from or add to this set but cannot remove from it. We rename this to sent in both
ours and Lamport et al.’s specifications for clarity purposes. This is the only variable
maintained in our specifications.
• maxBal : per acceptor, the highest ballot seen by the acceptor.
• maxVBal and maxVal : per acceptor, the highest ballot in which the acceptor has voted
and the value the acceptor voted for in the highest ballot, respectively.
Basic Paxos algorithm steps. The algorithm consists of repeatedly executing two phases.
Each phase comprises two actions, one by acceptors and one by proposers.
• Phase 1a. Fig. 1 shows Lamport’s description in English followed by Lamport et
al.’s and our specifications. Send is an operator that adds its argument to sent , i.e.,
Send(m) , sent ′ = sent ∪ {m}.
1. The first conjunct in Lamport et al.’s specification is not mentioned in the English
description and is not needed. Therefore it was removed.
2. The third conjunct is also removed because the only variable our specification
maintains is sent , which is updated by Send .
• Phase 1b. Fig. 2 shows the English description and the specifications of Phase 1b.
The first two conjuncts in both specifications capture the precondition in the English
description. The remaining conjuncts specify the action.
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1. The first conjunct states that message m received by acceptor a is of type 1a.
2. The second conjunct ensures that the proposal number bal in the 1a message m
is higher than that of any 1a request responded to by a. In Lamport et al.’s
specification, derived variable maxBal [a] maintains the highest proposal number
that a has ever responded to, in both 1b and 2b messages, and its second conjunct
uses m.bal > maxBal [a]. Using sent only, we capture this intent more directly, as
∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧ m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal , because
those m2’s are the response messages that a has ever sent.
3. The third conjunct is the action of sending a promise (1b message) not to ac-
cept any more proposals numbered less than bal and with the highest-numbered
proposal (if any) that a has accepted, i.e., has sent a 2b message. This proposal
is maintained in Lamport et al.’s specification in derived variables maxVBal and
maxVal . We specify this proposal as max_prop(a), which is either the set of
proposals that have the highest proposal number among all accepted by a or, if a
has not accepted anything, {[bal 7→ −1, val 7→ ⊥]}, where −1 /∈ B and is smaller
than all ballots and ⊥ /∈ V. The latter corresponds to initialization in Lamport et
al.’s specification as shown in Fig. 5, discussed later. Note that the specification
in Appendix A writes ⊥ as None.
4. The remaining conjuncts in Lamport et al.’s specification maintain the variable
maxBal [a]. A compiler that implements incrementalization [26] over queries would
automatically generate and maintain such a derived variable to optimize the cor-
responding query.
• Phase 2a. Fig. 3 shows the specifications of Phase 2a. The specifications differ from
the English description by using a set of quorums, Q, instead of a majority. The only
difference between the two specifications is the removed unchanged conjunct when
using sent only. It is important to note that the English description fails to mention
the first conjunct, without which the specification is unsafe. Appendix F describes a
run that violates Agreement when the first conjunct of Phase2a is removed. That is,
for Lamport’s specification to be safe, every 2a message must have a unique ballot.
Note that the first conjunct in Lamport et al.’s specification (and therefore ours as
well) states that none of the 2a messages sent so far has bal equal to b. This is
not directly implementable in a real system because this quantification query requires
accessing message histories of all processes. We leave this query as is for two main
reasons: (i) The focus of this paper is to demonstrate the use of history variables
against derived variables and compare them in the light of simpler specification and
verification. This removes derived variables but leaves queries on history variables
unchanged even though they are not directly implementable. (ii) There is a commonly-
used, straightforward, efficient way to implement this query, namely, realizing ballot
as a tuple in N×P [43]. So a proposer only executes Phase 2a on a ballot proposed by
itself (i.e., sent a 1a message with that ballot) and, for efficient implementation, only
executes Phase 2a on the highest ballot that it has proposed.
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Phase 1b. If an acceptor receives a 1a request with number bal greater than that
of any 1a request to which it has already responded, then it responds to the request
with a promise not to accept any more proposals numbered less than bal and with the
highest-numbered proposal (if any) that it has accepted.
Lamport et al.’s Using sent only
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal > maxBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
acc 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal ,
maxVBal 7→ maxVBal [a],
maxVal 7→ maxVal [a]])
∧maxBal ′ =
[maxBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈maxVBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ sent , r ∈ max_prop(a) :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”}∧
m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
acc 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal ,
maxVBal 7→ r .bal ,
maxVal 7→ r .val ])
2bs(a), {m ∈ sent :m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = a}
max_prop(a) ,
if 2bs(a) = ∅ then {[bal 7→ −1, val 7→ ⊥]}
else {m ∈ 2bs(a) :∀m2 ∈ 2bs(a) :m.bal ≥ m2.bal}
Figure 2: Specifications of Phase 1b of Basic Paxos
Phase 2a. If the proposer receives a response to its 1a requests (numbered b) from a
majority of acceptors, then it sends a 2a request to each of those acceptors for a proposal
numbered b with a value v , where v is the value of the highest-numbered proposal among
the 1b responses, or is any value if the responses reported no proposals.
Lamport et al.’s Using sent only
Phase2a(b ∈ B) ,
∧∄m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ∧m.bal = b
∧∃ v ∈ V,Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ sent :
m.type = “1b” ∧m.bal = b} :
∧∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.acc = a
∧ ∨ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = −1
∨∃ c ∈ 0..(b − 1) :
∧∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ c
∧∃m ∈ S : ∧m.maxVBal = c
∧m.maxVal = v
∧Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])
∧unchanged 〈maxBal ,maxVBal ,maxVal 〉
Phase2a(b ∈ B) ,
∧∄m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ∧m.bal = b
∧∃ v ∈ V,Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ sent :
m.type = “1b” ∧m.bal = b} :
∧∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.acc = a
∧ ∨ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = −1
∨∃ c ∈ 0..(b − 1) :
∧∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ c
∧∃m ∈ S : ∧m.maxVBal = c
∧m.maxVal = v
∧Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])
Figure 3: Specifications of Phase 2a of Basic Paxos
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• Phase 2b. Fig. 4 shows specifications of Phase 2b. Like for Phase 1b, we replace the
second conjunct with the corresponding query over sent and remove updates to the
derived variables.
Phase 2b. If an acceptor receives a 2a request for a proposal numbered bal , it accepts
the proposal unless it has already responded to a 1a request having a number greater
than bal .
Lamport et al.’s Using sent only
Phase2b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧m.bal ≥ maxBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “2b”, acc 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal , val 7→ m.val ])
∧maxBal ′ = [maxBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧maxVBal ′ = [maxVBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧maxVal ′ = [maxVal except ![a] = m.val ]
Phase2b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧∀m2 ∈ sent :m2.type ∈ {“1b”,“2b”}∧
m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal ≥ m2.bal
∧Send([type 7→ “2b”, acc 7→ a,
bal 7→ m.bal , val 7→ m.val ])
Figure 4: Specifications of Phase 2b of Basic Paxos
Overall Basic Paxos algorithm. To complete the algorithm specification, we define, and
compare, vars , Init , Next , and Spec which are typical TLA+ operator names for the set
of variables, the initial state, possible actions leading to the next state, and the system
specification, respectively, in Fig. 5.
Lamport et al.’s initialization of maxVBal and maxVal to −1 and ⊥, respectively, is
moved to our definition of max_prop in Fig. 2. Note that we do not need maxBal at all,
but instead use the universally quantified queries directly in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4. Lamport et
al.’s specification uses maxBal and initializes it to −1, which is smaller than all ballots, and
thus, the conjunct m.bal > maxBal [a] in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4 holds if no 1a or 2a messages were
received before.
The complete Basic Paxos algorithm specification is given in Appendix A.
4 Invariants and proofs using message history variables
4.1 Invariants
Invariants of a distributed algorithm can be categorized into the following three kinds:
1. Type invariants. These ensure that all data processed in the algorithm are of valid
types. For example, messages of type 1a must have a field bal ∈ B. If an action sends
a 1a message with bal missing or bal /∈ B, a type invariant is violated.
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Lamport et al.’s Using sent only
vars , 〈sent ,maxBal ,maxVBal ,maxVal 〉
Init , ∧sent = ∅
∧maxVBal = [a ∈ A 7→ −1]
∧maxBal = [a ∈ A 7→ −1]
∧maxVal = [a ∈ A 7→ ⊥]
vars , 〈sent 〉
Init , sent = ∅
Next , ∨∃ b ∈ B : Phase1a(b) ∨ Phase2a(b)
∨∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ∨ Phase2b(a)
Spec , Init ∧✷[Next ]vars
Figure 5: Overall algorithm specification
2. Message invariants. These are invariants defined on message history variables. For
example, each message of type 2a has a unique bal . This is expressed by the invariant
∀m1,m2 ∈ sent : m1.type = “2a” ∧m2.type = “2a” ∧m1.bal = m2.bal ⇒ m1 = m2.
3. Process invariants. These state properties about the data maintained in derived vari-
ables. For example, in Lamport et al.’s specification, one such invariant is that for any
acceptor a, maxBal [a] ≥ maxVBal [a].
Fig. 6 shows and compares all invariants used in Lamport et al.’s proof vs. ours. The
following operators are used in the invariants for brevity (single-line comments start with \*
in TLA+):
VotedForIn(a, v , b) , ∃m ∈ sent : ∧m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = a ∧m.val = v ∧m.bal = b
WontVoteIn(a, b) , ∀ v ∈ V : \* Lamport et al.’s
¬VotedForIn(a, v , b) ∧maxBal [a] > b
WontVoteIn(a, b) , ∀ v ∈ V : \* Using sent only
¬VotedForIn(a, v , b) ∧ ∃m ∈ sent : m.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m.acc = a ∧m.bal > b
SafeAt(v , b) , ∀ b2 ∈ 0..(b − 1) :∃Q ∈ Q :∀ a ∈ Q :VotedForIn(a, v , b2) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b2)
(8)
The complete invariants, auxiliary operators, and the safety property to be proved can
be found in Appendix B.
4.2 Proving type invariants and process invariants
Type invariants reduced to one. Lamport et al. define four type invariants, one for each
variable they maintain. Messages is the set of all possible valid messages. We require only
one, (I1). This invariant asserts that the type of all sent messages is valid. (I2) - (I4) are
not applicable to our specification.
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Lamport et al.’s proof Our proof
Type
Invariants
(I1) sent ⊆ Messages sent ⊆ Messages
(I2) maxVBal ∈ [A → B ∪ {−1}]
(I3) maxBal ∈ [A → B ∪ {−1}]
(I4) maxVal ∈ [A → V ∪ {⊥}]
Process
Invariants
∀ a ∈ A
(I5) maxBal [a] ≥ maxVBal [a]
(I6) maxVal [a] = ⊥ ⇔ maxVBal [a] = −1
(I7) maxVBal [a] ≥ 0⇒
VotedForIn(a,maxVal [a],maxVBal [a])
(I8) ∀ b ∈ B : b > maxVBal [a] ⇒
∄v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, v , b)
Message
Invariants
∀m∈sent
(I9) m.type= “2b”⇒m.bal≤maxBal [m.acc]
(I10) m.type= “1b”⇒m.bal≤maxBal [m.acc]
(I11) m.type = “1b” ⇒ m.type = “1b” ⇒
∨∧m.maxVal ∈ V ∧m.maxVBal ∈ B
∧VotedForIn(m.acc, ∨VotedForIn(m.acc,
m.maxVal ,m.maxVBal) m.maxVal ,m.maxVBal)
∨m.maxVBal = −1 ∧m.maxVal = ⊥ ∨m.maxVBal = −1
(I12) m.type = “1b” ⇒
∀ b2 ∈ m.maxVBal + 1..m.bal − 1 : ∄v ∈ V : VotedForIn(m.acc, v , b2)
(I13) m.type = “2a” ⇒ SafeAt(m.val ,m.bal)
(I14) m.type = “2a” ⇒
∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ⇒ m2 = m
(I15) m.type = “2b” ⇒
∃m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.val = m.val
Figure 6: Comparison of invariants. Our proof does not need I2-I10, and needs only I1, a
simpler I11, and I12-I15.
Process invariants not needed. Lamport et al. define four process invariants, (I5) -
(I8), regarding variables maxVal , maxVBal , and maxBal . They are not applicable to our
specification, and need not be given in our proof.
• (I5). Because maxBal [a] is the highest ballot ever seen by a and maxVBal [a] is the
highest ballot a has voted for, the following invariants hold:
maxBal [a] ≡ max({m.bal : m ∈ sent ∧m.type∈{“1b”,“2b”} ∧m.acc = a})
maxV Bal[a] ≡ max({m.bal : m ∈ sent ∧m.type∈{“2b”} ∧m.acc = a})
(9)
where max(S ) , choose e ∈ S ∪ {−1} : ∀ f ∈ S : e ≥ f . Note that max is not in TLA+
and has to be user-defined. Invariant (I5) is needed in Lamport et al.’s proof but not ours
because they use derived variables whereas we specify the properties directly. For example,
for Lamport et al.’s Phase 1b, one cannot deduce m.bal > maxVBal [a] without (I5), whereas
in our Phase 1b, definitions of 2bs and max_prop along with the second conjunct are enough
to deduce it.
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• (I6). Lamport et al.’s proof needs this invariant to prove (I11). Because the initial
values are part of Init and are not explicitly present in their Phase 1b, this additional
invariant is needed to carry this information along. We include the initial values when
specifying the action in Phase 1b and therefore do not need this invariant.
• (I7). This invariant is obvious from the definition of VotedForIn in Equation (3) and
property of maxVBal in Equation (4). The premise maxVBal [a] ≥ 0 is needed by Lamport
et al.’s proof to differentiate from the initial value −1 of maxVBal [a].
• (I8). This states that a has not voted for any value at a ballot higher thanmaxVBal [a].
This invariant need not be manually given in our proofs because it is implied from the
definition of maxVBal [a].
4.3 Proving message invariants
With history variables, message invariants are either not needed or are more easily proved.
Message invariants (I9) and (I10) follow directly from (9) and need not be manually specified
for our proof. Before detailing the other message invariants, we present a systematic method
that can derive all but one useful invariant used by Lamport et al. and thus make the proofs
easier.
Our method is based on the following properties of our specifications and distributed
algorithms:
1. sent grows monotonically, that is, the only operations on it are read and add.
2. Message invariants hold for each sent message of some type, i.e., they are of the form
∀m ∈ sent : m.type = τ ⇒ Φ(m), or more conveniently if we define sent
τ
= {m ∈
sent : m.type = τ}, we have ∀m ∈ sent
τ
: Φ(m).
3. sent = ∅ initially, so the message invariants are vacuously true in the initial state of
the system.
4. Distributed algorithms usually implement a logical clock for ordering two arbitrary
messages. In Paxos, this is done by ballots.
We demonstrate our method by deriving (I15). The method is applied for each message
type used in the algorithm. Invariant (I15) is about 2b messages. We first identify all actions
that send 2b messages and then do the following:
1. Increment. 2b messages are sent in Phase 2b as specified in Fig. 4. We first determine
the increment to sent , ∆(sent), the new messages sent in Phase 2b. We denote a
message in ∆(sent) by δ for brevity. We have, from Fig. 4,
δ = [type 7→ “2b”, acc 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , val 7→ m.val ] (10)
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2. Analyze. We deduce properties about the messages in ∆(sent). For 2b messages, we
deduce the most straightforward property that connects the contents of messages in
∆(sent) with the message m, from Fig. 4,
φ(δ) = ∃m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ∧ δ.bal = m.bal ∧ δ.val = m.val (11)
3. Integrate. Because (i) sent monotonically increases, and (ii) φ is an existential quan-
tification over sent , φ holds for all increments to sent2b . Property (i) means that once
the existential quantification in φ holds, it holds forever. Integrating both sides of
Equation (6) in the space of 2b messages yields (I15), that is,
Φ(sent2b) = ∀m2 ∈ sent2b : ∃m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.val = m.val
(12)
The case for φ being universally quantified over sent is discussed with invariant (I12).
We also derive (I11), (I12), and (I14) as described in the following.
• (I11). Like (I15), (I11) can also be systematically derived, from our Phase 1b in Fig. 2.
This invariant is less obvious and harder to prove when variables maxVal and maxVBal
are explicitly used and updated because (i) they are not updated in the same action that
uses them, requiring additional invariants to carry their meaning to the proofs involving the
actions that use them, and (ii) it is not immediately clear if these variables are being updated
in Lamport et al.’s Phase 2b in Fig. 4 because a 2b message is being sent or because a 2a
message was received.
• (I12). To derive (I11) and (I15), we focused on where the contents of the new message
come from. For (I12), we analyze why those contents were chosen. From our Phase 1b with
definitions of 2bs and max_prop in Fig. 2, we have
φ(δ) =
∨ ∧ ∃m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = δ.acc
∧ ∀m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = δ.acc⇒ δ.maxV Bal ≥ m.bal
∨ ∧ ∄ m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = δ.acc
∧ δ.maxV Bal = −1
(13)
φ has two disjuncts—the first has a universal quantification and the second has a negated
existential quantification, which is universal in disguise. If sent is universally quantified,
integration as for (I15) is not possible because the quantification only holds at the time of
the action. As new messages are sent in the future, the universal may become violated.
The key is the phrase at the time. One way to work around the universal is to add a
time field in each message and update it in every action as a message is sent, such as using
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a logical clock. Then, a property of the form φ(δ) = ∀m ∈ sent
τ
: ψ(m) can be integrated
to obtain
Φ(sent
τ
) = ∀m2 ∈ sent
τ
: ∀m ∈ sent : m.time < m2.time ⇒ ψ(m) (14)
Because ballots act as the logical clock in Paxos, we do not need to specify a separate logical
clock and we can perform the above integration on (13) to obtain invariant (I12).
• (I14). This invariant is of the form ∀m1, m2 ∈ sent
τ
, t : ψ(m1, t)∧ψ(m2, t) ⇒ m1 =
m2. In this case, ψ(m, t) , m.bal = t . Deriving invariants like (I14) is nontrivial unless ψ
is already known. In some cases, ψ can be guessed. The intuition is to look for a universal
quantification (or negated existential) in the specification of an action. The ideal case is when
the quantification is on the message type being sent in the action. Potential candidates for
ψ may be hidden in such quantifications. Moreover, if message history variables are used,
these quantifications are easier to identify.
Starting with a guess of ψ, we identify the change in the counting measure (cardinality)
of the set {t : m ∈ sent
τ
∧ ψ(m, t)} along with that of sent
τ
. In the case of (I14), we look
for ∆(|{m.bal : m ∈ sent2a}|). From our Phase 2a in Fig. 3, we have
∆({m.bal : m ∈ sent2a}) = {b}
φ(b) = ∄m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ∧m.bal = b,
where b ∈ ∆({m.bal : m ∈ sent2a})
(15)
Rewriting φ as {b} 6⊆ {m.bal : m ∈ sent2a}, it becomes clear that ∆(|{m.bal : m ∈
sent2a}|) = 1. Meanwhile, ∆(|{m ∈ sent2a}|) = 1. Because the counting measure increases
by the same amount for both, (I14) can be derived safely.
4.4 Basic Paxos proof
The main property to prove is Agreement , defined as follows:
Inv , TypeOK ∧MsgInv
Agree , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V : Chosen(v1) ∧ Chosen(v2)⇒ v1 = v2
theorem Agreement , Spec ⇒ ✷Agree
(16)
To proceed, we first prove Inv ⇒ Agree. We then prove Spec ⇒ ✷Inv and, by temporal
logic, conclude Spec ⇒ ✷Agree. Note that property Agreement is called Consistent , and
invariant Agree is called Consistency by Lamport et al. [25].
To prove Agree for the algorithm, we first prove the following helper lemmas for three
important properties:
1. Lemma VotedInv . If any acceptor votes any pair 〈v , b〉, then the predicate SafeAt(v , b)
holds:
lemma VotedInv , MsgInv ∧ TypeOK ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, v ∈ V, b ∈ B :
VotedForIn(a, v , b)⇒ SafeAt(v , b)
(17)
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2. Lemma VotedOnce. If acceptor a1 votes pair 〈v1, b〉 and acceptor a2 votes pair 〈v2, b〉,
then v1 = v2:
lemma VotedOnce , MsgInv ⇒ ∀ a1, a2 ∈ A, v1, v2 ∈ V, b ∈ B :
VotedForIn(a1, v1, b)∧VotedForIn(a2, v2, b)⇒ v1 = v2
(18)
3. Lemma SafeAtStable. If pair 〈v , b〉 is safe in the current state, it remains safe in the
next state, where state transition is defined by Next .
lemma SafeAtStable , Inv ∧ Next ⇒ ∀ v ∈ V, b ∈ B :
SafeAt(v , b)⇒ SafeAt(v , b)′
(19)
The proof of Spec ⇒ ✷Inv follows the same strategy as used in Chand et al. [4]. The
proof is inductive, written in a hierarchical style [22]. The base case proves Init ⇒ Inv . The
inductive case considers each action in Next individually, and proves that Inv holds in the
next state given that it holds in the current state.
The complete TLAPS-checked proof for Basic Paxos spans about 2 pages, and is sum-
marized as follows:
1. The three lemmas and their proofs are about half a page.
2. The proof of type invariant TypeOK is a quarter page, using only a 1-level proof for
each action.
3. The proof of message invariant MsgInv is less than a page, using 1-level proofs for
actions Phase1a, Phase1b, and Phase2b, together taking less than a half a page, and
a 4-level proof for Phase2a, taking half a page.
4. The proof of theorem Agreement using Spec ⇒ ✷Inv is a quarter page, with a straight-
forward argument of Inv ⇒ Agree.
The complete proof is given in Appendix C.
5 Multi-Paxos
We have developed new specifications of Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption
that use only message history variables. Section 5.1 outlines and compares two approaches
to develop these specifications from existing specifications. Section 5.2 discusses specification
of Multi-Paxos with Preemption. The complete specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
is provided in Appendix D. Section 5.3 describes two invariants used in our proofs. One of
the invariants is new compared to Chand et al. [4], while the other is similar to an invariant
used in [4] but our invariant is simpler. The other invariants used by us compare to theirs
similar to our invariants for Basic Paxos compared with Lamport et al.’s as described in
Section 4, and are therefore moved to Appendix E. Section 5.4 discusses the importance of
these specifications to the proof, in particular how these helped in reducing proof size by
48%.
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5.1 Specification of Multi-Paxos
Fig. 7 shows two approaches to derive the specification of Multi-Paxos with history variables
using existing specifications: (1) From Chand et al.’s Multi-Paxos that uses derived vari-
ables [4], removing derived variables to use only history variables, similar to the specification
of Basic Paxos described in Section 3 and, (2) From Basic Paxos that uses only history
variables, by adding slots to obtain Multi-Paxos.
Basic Paxos Lam [25]
Ý Derived variables
Ä Slots
extra
Multi-Paxos Cha [4]
Ý Derived variables
Ý Slots
Basic Paxos Us
Ä Derived variables
Ä Slots
Multi-Paxos Us
Ä Derived variables
Ý Slots
Section 3[4]
Section 5 Section 5
Figure 7: Derivation showing two approaches to develop specification for Multi-Paxos with
history variables.
To compare these two approaches, we use Phase 1b as an example. Following is the
English description of Phase 1b of Multi-Paxos, obtained from that of Basic Paxos (Fig. 2)
by adding “for each slot” at the end:
If an acceptor receives a 1a request with number bal greater than that of any 1a
request to which it has already responded, then it responds to the request with a
promise not to accept any more proposals numbered less than bal and with the
highest-numbered proposal (if any) that it has accepted for each slot.
This implies an obvious way to obtain Multi-Paxos—by specifying Basic Paxos per slot.
In practice, this would mean executing multiple instances of Basic Paxos. This is inefficient
and yields impractical specifications. For instance, in Phase 1b sending multiple 1bmessages,
one per slot, is worse than sending a single 1b message with the set of accepted proposals
for each slot.
From Multi-Paxos that uses derived variables. The development of Phase 1b for this
approach follows closely that of Basic Paxos. The two specifications are shown in Fig. 8—on
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the left we have the specification of Phase 1b from Chand et al. [4] and on the right we have
our specification of Phase 1b that uses only history variables. The first difference is replacing
aBal with a query over sent . aBal is called maxBal in Basic Paxos (Fig. 2) and therefore the
query is the same as in our specification of Basic Paxos that uses only history variables. The
second difference is replacing aVoted [a] with PartialBmax (voteds(a)). voteds(a) is the set
of all 〈ballot , slot , value〉 triples that acceptor a has voted for. PartialBmax (T ) is a subset
of votes in T , one vote per slot, that contains only the highest-numbered vote for that slot
in T .
Multi-Paxos that uses derived variables [4] After removing derived variables
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ msgs :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧m.bal > aBal [a]
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal ,
voted 7→ aVoted [a]])
∧aBal ′ = [aBal except ![a] = m.bal ]
∧unchanged 〈pBal , aVoted 〉
Phase1b(a ∈ A) ,
∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”}∧
m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal
∧Send([type 7→ “1b”,
from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal ,
voted 7→ PartialBmax (voteds(a))])
PartialBmax (T ) , {t ∈ T : ∀ t2 ∈ T :
t .slot = t2.slot ⇒ t .bal ≥ t2.bal}
voteds(a) ,
{[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ m.slot , val 7→ m.val ] :
m ∈ 2bs(a)}
Figure 8: Change to Phase 1b of Multi-Paxos that uses derived variables, to using only
history variables.
From Basic Paxos that uses only history variables. Two modifications need to be
made for this approach: (1) adding slots and, (2) replying with a set of votes as opposed to
a single vote in Basic Paxos. Recalling that “the highest-numbered proposal (if any) that it
has accepted” was specified by max_prop in Fig. 2 and that the only change to the English
description was adding “for each slot” to the aforementioned phrase, so the main change to
add slots would be a small change in max_prop as shown in Fig. 9. Finally, adding the
change to reply with a set of votes leads to the specification shown in Fig. 8.
Lessons learned. The second approach is easier than the first approach because the change
is smaller and more easily isolated. The change in the first approach requires replacing
derived variables. which is more difficult, especially for aVoted [a] which is updated in Phase
2b of Chand et al. [4] using the following complex expression:
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Basic Paxos that uses only history variables After adding slots
max_prop(a) ,
if 2bs(a) = ∅ then {[bal 7→ −1, val 7→ ⊥]}
else {m ∈ 2bs(a) : ∀m2 ∈ 2bs(a) :
m.bal ≥ m2.bal}
max_prop(a) ,
if 2bs(a) = ∅ then {[bal 7→ −1, val 7→ ⊥]}
else {m ∈ 2bs(a) : ∀m2 ∈ 2bs(a) :
m.slot = m2.slot ⇒m.bal ≥ m2.bal}
Figure 9: Change to Phase 1b of Basic Paxos that uses only history variables to add slots.
aV oted′ = [aV oted except ![a] =
∪ {[bal 7→ m.bal, slot 7→ d.slot, val 7→ d.val] : d ∈ m.propSV } (20)
∪ {e ∈ aV oted[a] : ∄ r ∈ m.propSV : e.slot = r.slot}]
5.2 Specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
Specification of preemption required defining a new action and changing Phase 1a as follows:
• Add action Preempt. With preemption, if an acceptor receives a 1a or 2a message with
a ballot smaller than the highest that it has seen, it responds with a preempt message
that contains the highest ballot it has seen. Chand et al. [4] specify this by changing
their specifications of Phase 1b and Phase 2b with repeated logic formulae as shown in
Fig. 10 (the else branch). We specify a new action leading to a cleaner specification.
In our specification in Fig. 10, m is the 1a or 2a message that acceptor a received, and
m2 is a 1b or 2b message already sent by a whose ballot is higher than m.bal .
Most importantly, our specification led us to identify a subtlety in Chand et al.’s
specification that can cause unnecessary preemptions. In their specification of Phase
1b, an acceptor sends a preempt message upon receiving a duplicate 1a message instead
of ignoring it, causing the proposer to unnecessarily preempt. While this does not affect
safety, it may impact liveness if not handled correctly by the proposer.
• Change Phase1a. Phase1a remains unchanged between Basic Paxos and Multi-Paxos.
However with preemption, upon receiving a preempt message with a ballot higher than
every ballot on which the receiving proposer has ever initiated Phase 1a, the proposer
needs to pick a new ballot and initiate Phase 1a on it. Fig. 11 shows the specifications
of Phase 1a for Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption. If the proposer receives
a preempt message with a ballot higher than the ballots of all 1a messages that it has
sent, it picks a new ballot higher than the ballot of the preempt message and sends a
1a message with this new ballot.
5.3 Invariants
Following our methodology, we were able to derive all but two invariants in the case of
Multi-Paxos. One of the invariants is similar to (I13), which we also do not derive for Basic
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Chand et al. [4] Us
Phase1b(a ∈ A) , ∃m ∈ sent :
∧ m.type = “1a”
∧ ifm.bal > aBal [a]then . . .
else ∧ Send([type 7→ “preempt” ,
to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]])
∧unchanged 〈aVoted , aBal , pBal 〉
Phase2b(a ∈ A) , ∃m ∈ sent :
∧ m.type = “2a”
∧ ifm.bal ≥ aBal [a]then . . .
else ∧ Send([type 7→ “preempt” ,
to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ aBal [a]])
∧unchanged 〈aVoted , aBal , pBal 〉
Preempt(a ∈ A) , ∃m ∈ sent ,m2 ∈ 1b2b(a) :
∧ m.type ∈ {“1a”, “2a”}
∧ m2.bal > m.bal
∧ ∀m3 ∈ 1b2b(a) : m2.bal ≥ m3.bal
∧ Send([type 7→ “preempt” , to 7→ m.from,
bal 7→ m2.bal ])
1b2b(a) ,
{m ∈ sent : m.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m.from = a}
Figure 10: Specifications for preemption in Chand et al. and us. The “ . . .” in Chand et al.’s
specification correspond to parts of Phase1b and Phase2b that do not apply to preemption.
Multi-Paxos Multi-Paxos with Preemption
Phase1a(p ∈ P) , ∃ b ∈ B :
Send([type 7→ “1a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ b])
Phase1a(p ∈ P) , ∃ b ∈ B :
∧ ∨ ∄m ∈ sent : m.type = “preempt” ∧m.to = p
∨∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “preempt” ∧m.to = p ∧ b > m.bal
∧∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “1a” ∧m2.from = p
⇒ m.bal > m2.bal
∧ Send([type 7→ “1a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ b])
Figure 11: Our specifications of Phase 1a for Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption
Paxos. The other is a 1b message invariant, (I26), shown in Fig. 12. Additionally, one of
the 1b message invariants generated by us, (I27), is slightly different than its counterpart in
Chand et al.’s proof, also shown in Fig. 12. Comparison of other invariants is similar to
that for Basic Paxos (Fig. 6) and therefore the complete list for Multi-Paxos is moved to
Appendix E.
Invariant (I26) states that for every 1b message m, slot s and ballot b smaller than m.bal ,
if acceptor m.from has voted in b for s then there must exist a vote in m.voted with slot s
and ballot greater than or equal to b.
Invariant (I27) in Chand et al. [4] states that for every 1b message m, slot s and bal-
lot b higher than the highest ballot that m.from has voted in for slot s , and lower than
the ballot in m, m.from has not voted any value v for slot s in ballot b. The operator
MaxVotedBallotInSlot is defined as
MaxVotedBallotInSlot(D , s) , max({d .bal : d ∈ {d ∈ D : d .slot = s}}) (21)
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(I26) ∀m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1b” ⇒
∀ b ∈ 0..m.bal − 1, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v)⇒
∃ r ∈ m.voted : r .slot = s ∧ r .bal ≥ b
(I27) ∀m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀m ∈ msgs : m.type = “1b” ⇒
∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : ∀ r ∈ m.voted :
b ∈ MaxVotedBallotInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1..m.bal − 1⇒ ∀ b ∈ r .bal + 1..m.bal − 1, v ∈ V :
¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s , v) ¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, r .slot , v)
Figure 12: Comparison of 1b message invariants that are new (I26) or are different (I27).
We derive a similar invariant but without the notion of “highest ballot”. Our invariant
states that for every 1b message m, and vote r in m.voted , m.from has not voted in any
ballot higher than the ballot in r and less than the ballot in m for the slot in r .
Because m.from has voted for every triple in m.voted , this means that in Chand et al.’s
specification, m.voted may have multiple votes for the same slot, and therefore they take a
max in their invariant, whereas in our specification, m.voted has only one vote per slot—the
one with the highest ballot as can be seen from Fig. 8 following the definitions of PartialBmax
and voteds.
Consider Chand et al.’s Phase 1b in Fig. 8, note that m.voted copies the derived variable
aVoted [m.from] and consider Chand et al.’s update logic of aVoted in (20), we can see that
for each slot that m.from has voted for, aVoted [m.from] only maintains the vote with the
highest ballot. This means that even in Chand et al.’s proof, invariant (I27) could be relaxed
to the one used by us, leading to a smaller proof for reasons described in Section 5.4. This
only bolsters our claim that only using history variables leads to simpler specifications and
easier proofs.
5.4 Proof
While we observed a quarter decrease in proof size for Basic Paxos, for Multi-Paxos this
decrease was almost a half. Besides the simplifications described in Section 4, an important
player in this decrease was the absence of the operatorMaxVotedBallotInSlot used by Chand
et al. [4]. Five lemmas were needed in Chand et al.’s proof to assert basic properties of the
operator. For example, lemma MVBISType stated that if D ⊆ [bal : B, slot : S, val : V],
then the result of the operator is in B ∪ {−1}.
Absence of this operator and not having derived variables attributed to more than two-
thirds of the decrease in proof size. This includes: (1) removing lemmas forMaxVotedBallotInSlot
and their proofs, and deriving a different message invariant (I27) that does not contain the
operator leading to a smaller proof, (2) removing process invariants and their proofs and, (3)
removing message invariants with derived variables (similar to I9 and I10) and their proofs
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The remaining decrease in proof size is attributed to proof improvements, for example,
removing unnecessary manually written proofs for obligations that can be automatically
proven by backend provers.
6 Results
Table 1 summarizes the results of our specifications and proofs that use only message history
variables, compared with those by Lamport et al. [25] and Chand et al. [4]. We observe an
improvement of about a quarter across all stats for Basic Paxos and about a half for Multi-
Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption. Following, we list some important results:
• The specification size decreased by 13 lines (25%) for Basic Paxos, from 52 lines for
Lamport et al.’s specification to 39 lines for ours. For Multi-Paxos, the decrease is 36
lines (46%), from 78 lines for Chand et al.’s to 42 lines for ours, and for Multi-Paxos
with Preemption, the decrease is 45 lines (46%), from 97 to 52.
• The total number of manually written invariants decreased by 54% overall—by 9 (60%)
from 15 to 6 for Basic Paxos, by 8 (50%) from 16 to 8 for Multi-Paxos, and by 9 (53%)
from 17 to 8 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption. This significant decrease is because
we do not maintain derived variables maxBal , maxVBal , and maxVal as explained
in Section 4.
• The proof size for Basic Paxos decreased by 83 lines (27%), from 310 to 227. This
decrease is attributed to the fact that our specification does not use other state variables
besides sent . For Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption, this decrease is 468
lines (47%), from 988 to 520, and 494 lines (48%), from 1032 to 538, respectively. The
proof size increases about 300 lines from Basic Paxos to Multi-Paxos because type
invariants and message invariants have to be proved over sets of tuples.
• Proof by contradiction is used twice in the proof by Lamport et al. and thrice for the
proofs in Chand et al. We were able to remove all of them because our specification uses
queries as opposed to derived variables. This yields easier-to-understand constructive
proofs.
• The number of proof obligations decreased by 46%—by 57 (24%) from 239 to 182 for
Basic Paxos, by 450 (49%) from 918 to 468 for Multi-Paxos, and by 468 (49%) from
959 to 491 for Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
• The proof-checking time decreased by 11 seconds (26%), from 42 to 31 for Basic Paxos.
For Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption, TLAPS took over 3 minutes for
the proofs in [4] and failed (due to updates in the new version of TLAPS) to check the
proofs of 5 obligations. In contrast, our proofs were checked successfully in 1.5 minutes
or less.
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Metric
Basic Paxos Multi-Paxos Multi-Paxos
with Preemption
Lam Us Decr Cha Us Decr Cha Us Decr
Specification size 52 39, 33* 25% 56^ 42 25% 75^ 52 31%
# invariants 15 6 60% 16 8 50% 17 8 53%
# type invariants 4 1 75% 4 1 75% 5 1 80%
# process invariants 4 0 100% 4 0 100% 4 0 100%
# message invariants 7 5 29% 8 7 13% 8 7 13%
Proof size 310 227, 115* 27% 1010^ 520 47% 1054^ 538 48%
Type invariants’ proof size 22 21, 12* 5% 54 34 37% 75 38 49%
Process invariants’ proof size 27 0, 0* 100% 136 0 100% 141 0 100%
1b† invariants’ proof size 21 15, 9* 29% 133 70 47% 133 70 47%
2a† invariants’ proof size 73 57, 21* 22% 264 120 55% 269 120 55%
2b† invariants’ proof size 14 12, 7* 14% 94 73 22% 94 73 22%
# proofs by contradiction 2 0 100% 3 0 100% 3 0 100%
# obligations in TLAPS 239 182 24% 918 468 49% 959 491 49%
Type inv proof obligations 17 17 0% 69 52 25% 100 60 40%
Process inv proof obligations 39 0 100% 163 0 100% 173 0 100%
1b† inv proof obligations 12 10 17% 160 80 50% 160 80 50%
2a† inv proof obligations 62 52 16% 241 145 40% 249 145 42%
2b† inv proof obligations 9 9 0% 77 44 43% 77 44 43%
TLAPS check time (seconds) 42 31 26% >191** 80 >58% >208** 90 >57%
Table 1: Summary of results. Lam is for Lamport et al. [25], Cha is from Chand et al. [4],
Us is ours in this paper, and Decr is percentage of decrease by Us from Lam and Cha.
Specification and proof sizes are measured in lines excluding comments and empty lines.
* indicates a number for the specification in Appendix A and proof in Appendix C, after
removing unnecessary line breaks from default latex generated by TLA+ Tools.
^ indicates a number; correcting a count oversight in [3]
† 1b invariants are (I10)–(I12), 2a invariants are (I13) and (I14), and 2b invariants are (I9)
and (I15) for Basic Paxos in Figure 6, and corresponding invariants for Multi-Paxos and
Multi-Paxos with Preemption in [4].
An obligation is a condition that TLAPS checks.
Check time is taken on an Intel i7-4720HQ 2.6 GHz CPU with 16 GB of memory, running
64-bit Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS and TLAPS 1.6.
** indicates that TLAPS 1.5.4 failed to check and gave up after that number of seconds.
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7 Related work and conclusion
History variables. History variables have been at the center of much debate since they
were introduced in the early 1970s [9, 8, 10]. Owicki and Gries [35] use them in an effort to
prove properties of parallel programs, criticized by Lamport in his writings [23]. Contrary to
ours, their history variables are auxiliary variables introduced for the sole purpose of simpler
proofs. Our history variables are sent and received , whose contents are actually processed
in all distributed system implementations.
Recently, Lamport and Merz [24] present rules to add history variables, among other
auxiliary variables, to a low-level specification so that a refinement mapping from a high-level
specification can be established. The idea is to prove invariants in the high-level specification
that serves as an abstraction of the low-level specification. In contrast, we focus on high-level
specifications because our target executable language is DistAlgo, and efficient lower-level
implementations can be generated systematically from high-level code.
Specification and verification. A number of systems [41, 12, 7], models [44, 5, 30], and
methods [36, 15, 16, 1] have been developed in the past to specify distributed algorithms and
mechanically check proofs of safety and liveness properties of the algorithms. This work is
orthogonal to them in the sense that the idea of maintaining only message history variables
can be incorporated in their specifications as well.
Closer to our work in terms of the specification is the work by Padon et al. [36], which
does not define any variable and instead defines predicate relations which would correspond
to manipulations of our history variables. For example, Send([type 7→ “1a”, bal 7→ b]) is
denoted by start_round_msg(b). Instead of using TLA+, they specify Paxos in first-order
logic to later exploit benefits of Effectively Propositional Logic, such as satisfiability being
decidable in it.
In contrast, we present a method to specify distributed algorithms using history variables,
implementable in high-level executable languages like DistAlgo, and then show (i) how such
specifications require fewer invariants for proofs and (ii) how many important invariants can
be systematically derived.
Conclusion. We have shown that using message history variables can lead to simpler
specifications and easier proofs of challenging distributed algorithms. Future work includes
applying our method in specification and proofs of other complex distributed algorithms,
and extending our method for proving liveness properties.
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A TLA+ specification of Basic Paxos
module PaxosSpec
This is a specification in TLA+ of BasicPaxos .
extends Integers , TLAPS , NaturalsInduction
constants A, Q, V Sets of acceptors, quorums of acceptors, and values to propose
variables sent Set of sent messages
assume QuorumAssumption , Q ⊆ subset A∧ ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅
B , N Set of ballots
vars , 〈sent〉
Send(m) , sent ′ = sent ∪ {m}
None , choose v : v /∈ V
Phase 1a: A 1a message with ballot b is sent by some proposer (to all processes).
Phase1a(b) , Send([type 7→ “1a”, bal 7→ b])
Phase 1b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 1a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than the highest it
has seen, a sends a 1b message with m.bal alongwith the highest-numbered pair it has voted for.
2bs(a) , {m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.acc = a}
max prop(a) , if 2bs(a) = ∅ then {[bal 7→ − 1, val 7→ None]}
else {m ∈ 2bs : ∀m2 ∈ 2bs : m.bal ≥ m2.bal}
Phase1b(a) , ∃m ∈ sent , r ∈ max prop(a) :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal
∧ Send([type 7→ “1b”, bal 7→ m.bal , maxVBal 7→ r .bal , maxVal 7→ r .val , acc 7→ a])
Phase 2a: If there is no 2a message in sent with ballot b, and a quorum of acceptors has sent a set S of 1b
messages with ballot b, a proposer sends a 2a message with ballot b and value v , where v is the value with
the highest ballot in S , or is any value in V if no acceptor that responded in S has voted for anything.
Phase2a(b) ,
∧ ∄m ∈ sent : (m.type = “2a”) ∧ (m.bal = b)
∧ ∃ v ∈ V , Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ sent : m.type = “1b” ∧m.bal = b} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.acc = a
∧ ∨ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = − 1
∨ ∃ b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1) :
∧ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ b2
∧ ∃m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = b2 ∧m.maxVal = v
∧ Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])
Phase 2b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 2a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than or equal to the
highest it has seen, a sends a 2b message with m.bal and m.val .
Phase2b(a) , ∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m2.acc = a ⇒ m.bal ≥ m2.bal
∧ Send([type 7→ “2b”, bal 7→ m.bal , val 7→ m.val , acc 7→ a])
Init , sent = ∅
Next , ∨ ∃ b ∈ B : Phase1a(b) ∨ Phase2a(b)
∨ ∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ∨ Phase2b(a)
Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
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B Agreement property to prove for Basic Paxos and in-
variants used in proof
module PaxosProp
VotedForIn(a, v , b) means that acceptor a has sent some 2b message m with m.val equal to v and m.bal
equal to b. This specifies that acceptor a has voted the pair 〈v , b〉.
VotedForIn(a, v , b) , ∃m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.val = v ∧m.bal = b ∧m.acc = a
ChosenIn(v , b) means that every acceptor in some quorum Q has voted the pair 〈v , b〉.
ChosenIn(v , b) , ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, v , b)
Chosen(v) means that for some ballot b, ChosenIn(v , b) holds.
Chosen(v) , ∃ b ∈ B : ChosenIn(v , b)
WontVoteIn(a, b) means that acceptor a has seen a higher ballot than b, and did not and will not vote any
value with ballot b.
WontVoteIn(a, b) , ∧ ∀ v ∈ V : ¬VotedForIn(a, v , b)
∧ ∃m ∈ sent : m.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m.acc = a ∧m.bal > b
SafeAt(v , b) means that no value except perhaps v has been or will be chosen in any ballot lower than b.
SafeAt(v , b) , ∀ b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1) : ∃Q ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q : VotedForIn(a, v , b2) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b2)
Messages defines the set of valid messages. TypeOK defines invariants for the types of the variables.
Messages , [type : {“1a”}, bal : B] ∪
[type : {“1b”}, bal : B, maxVBal : B ∪ { − 1}, maxVal : V ∪ {None}, acc : A] ∪
[type : {“2a”}, bal : B, val : V ] ∪
[type : {“2b”}, bal : B, val : V , acc : A]
TypeOK , sent ⊆ Messages
MsgInv defines properties satisfied by the contents of messages, for 1b, 2a, and 2b messages.
MsgInv , ∀m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∧ VotedForIn(m.acc, m.maxVal , m.maxVBal) ∨m.maxVBal = − 1
∧ ∀ b ∈ m.maxVBal + 1 . . m.bal − 1 : ∄ v ∈ V : VotedForIn(m.acc, v , b)
∧m.type = “2a” ⇒ ∧ SafeAt(m.val , m.bal)
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent : (m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal)⇒ m2 = m
∧m.type = “2b” ⇒ ∃m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧m2.val = m.val
Inv is the complete inductive invariant.
Inv , TypeOK ∧MsgInv
Agree states that at most one value can be chosen.
Agree , ∀ v1, v2 ∈ V : Chosen(v1) ∧ Chosen(v2)⇒ v1 = v2
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C TLAPS checked proof of Basic Paxos
module PaxosProof
The following two lemmas are straightforward consequences of the predicates defined in Appendix B.
lemma VotedInv , MsgInv ∧ TypeOK ⇒ ∀ a ∈ A, v ∈ V , b ∈ B : VotedForIn(a, v , b)⇒ SafeAt(v , b)
by def VotedForIn, MsgInv , Messages , TypeOK
lemma VotedOnce , MsgInv ⇒ ∀ a1, a2 ∈ A, v1, v2 ∈ V , b ∈ B :
VotedForIn(a1, v1, b) ∧ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b)⇒ v1 = v2
by def MsgInv , VotedForIn
Lemma SafeAtStable asserts that, if SafeAt(v , b) holds, it holds in the next state as well.
lemma SafeAtStable , Inv ∧ Next ⇒ ∀ v ∈ V , b ∈ B : SafeAt(v , b)⇒ SafeAt(v , b)′
〈1〉. suffices assume Inv , Next , new v ∈ V , new b ∈ B, SafeAt(v , b)
prove SafeAt(v , b)′ obvious
〈1〉.use def Send , Inv , B
〈1〉1. assume new b2 ∈ B, Phase1a(b2) prove SafeAt(v , b)′
by 〈1〉1, SMT def SafeAt , Phase1a, VotedForIn, WontVoteIn
〈1〉2. assume new a ∈ A, Phase1b(a) prove SafeAt(v , b)′
by 〈1〉2, QuorumAssumption, SMTT(60) def TypeOK , SafeAt , WontVoteIn, VotedForIn, Phase1b
〈1〉3. assume new b2 ∈ B, Phase2a(b2) prove SafeAt(v , b)′
by 〈1〉3, QuorumAssumption, SMT def TypeOK , SafeAt , WontVoteIn, VotedForIn, Phase2a
〈1〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove SafeAt(v , b)′
〈2〉1. pick m ∈ sent : Phase2b(a)!(m) by 〈1〉4 def Phase2b
〈2〉2. ∀ a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B, v2 ∈ V : VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)⇒ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′
by 〈2〉1 def TypeOK , VotedForIn
〈2〉3. assume new a2 ∈ A, new b2 ∈ B, WontVoteIn(a2, b2), new v2 ∈ V
prove ¬VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′
〈3〉1. pick m1 ∈ sent : m1.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m1.acc = a2 ∧m1.bal > b2by 〈2〉3 def WontVoteIn
〈3〉2. a2 = a ⇒ b2 6= m.bal by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉3, 〈3〉1, a2 = a ⇒ m.bal ≥ m1.bal def TypeOK , Messages
〈3〉3. a2 6= a ⇒ ¬VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′ by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉3 def WontVoteIn, VotedForIn
〈3〉.qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2, 〈2〉3, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3 def Phase2b, VotedForIn, WontVoteIn, TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈2〉4. ∀ a2 ∈ A, b2 ∈ B : WontVoteIn(a2, b2)⇒ WontVoteIn(a2, b2)′ by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉3 def WontVoteIn, Send
〈2〉.qed by 〈2〉2, 〈2〉4, QuorumAssumption def SafeAt
〈1〉.qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, 〈1〉3, 〈1〉4 def Next
Invariant asserts the temporal formula that if Spec holds then Inv always holds.
theorem Invariant , Spec ⇒ ✷Inv
〈1〉.use def B, 2bs , max prop
〈1〉1. Init ⇒ Inv by def Init , Inv , TypeOK , MsgInv , VotedForIn
〈1〉2. Inv ∧ [Next ]vars ⇒ Inv ′
〈2〉. suffices assume Inv , Next prove Inv ′
by def vars , Inv , TypeOK , MsgInv , VotedForIn, SafeAt , WontVoteIn
〈2〉.use def Inv
〈2〉1 proves TypeOK ′ for Next . Each of 〈3〉1-4 assumes the action of a phase and proves TypeOK ′ for that
case.
〈2〉1. TypeOK ′
〈3〉1. assume new b ∈ B, Phase1a(b) prove TypeOK ′ by 〈3〉1 def TypeOK , Phase1a, Send , Messages
〈3〉2. assume new b ∈ B, Phase2a(b) prove TypeOK ′
〈4〉. pick v ∈ V : Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])by 〈3〉2 def Phase2a
〈4〉. qed by def TypeOK , Send , Messages
〈3〉3. assume new a ∈ A, Phase1b(a) prove TypeOK ′
〈4〉. pick m ∈ sent , r ∈ max prop(a) : Phase1b(a)!(m, r)by 〈3〉3 def Phase1b
〈4〉. qed by def Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈3〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove TypeOK ′
〈4〉. pick m ∈ sent : Phase2b(a)!(m) by 〈3〉4 def Phase2b
〈4〉. qed by def Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈3〉. qed by 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3, 〈3〉4 def Next
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〈2〉2 proves MsgInv ′ for Next . Each of 〈3〉1-4 assumes the action of a phase and proves MsgInv ′ for that
case.
〈2〉2. MsgInv ′
〈3〉1. assume new b ∈ B, Phase1a(b) prove MsgInv ′
〈4〉1. ∀ a2, v2, b2 : VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′ ≡ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)by 〈3〉1 def Send , VotedForIn, Phase1a
〈4〉. qed by 〈3〉1, 〈4〉1, QuorumAssumption, SafeAtStable def Phase1a, MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈3〉2. assume new a ∈ A, Phase1b(a) prove MsgInv ′
〈4〉. pick m ∈ sent , r ∈ max prop(a) : Phase1b(a)!(m, r)by 〈3〉2 def Phase1b
〈4〉. define m2 , [type 7→ “1b”, bal 7→ m.bal , maxVBal 7→ r .bal , maxVal 7→ r .val , acc 7→ a]
〈4〉1. ∀ a2, v2, b2 : VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′ ≡ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)by def Send , VotedForIn
〈4〉2. VotedForIn(m2.acc, m2.maxVal , m2.maxVBal) ∨m2.maxVBal = − 1
by def TypeOK , Messages , VotedForIn
〈4〉3. ∀ b ∈ (r .bal + 1) . . (m2.bal − 1) : ∄ v ∈ V : VotedForIn(m2.acc, v , b)
by def TypeOK , Messages , VotedForIn, Send
〈4〉. qed by 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, 〈4〉3, SafeAtStable def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , Send
〈3〉3. assume new b ∈ B, Phase2a(b) prove MsgInv ′
〈4〉1. ∄m ∈ sent : (m.type = “2a”) ∧ (m.bal = b)by 〈3〉3 def Phase2a
〈4〉2. pick v ∈ V , Q ∈ Q, S ⊆ {m ∈ sent : m.type = “1b” ∧m.bal = b} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.acc = a
∧ ∨ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = − 1
∨ ∃ b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1) :
∧ ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ b2
∧ ∃m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = b2 ∧m.maxVal = v
∧ Send([type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ])by 〈3〉3 def Phase2a
〈4〉3. sent ′ = sent ∪ {[type 7→ “2a”, bal 7→ b, val 7→ v ]}by 〈4〉2 def Send
〈4〉4. ∀ a2, v2, b2 : VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′ ≡ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)by 〈4〉3 def VotedForIn
〈4〉5. ∀m, m2 ∈ sent ′ : m.type = “2a” ∧m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ⇒ m2 = m
by 〈4〉1, 〈4〉3, Isa def MsgInv
〈4〉6. SafeAt(v , b)
〈5〉1. case ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal = − 1by 〈4〉2, 〈5〉1 def TypeOK , MsgInv , SafeAt , WontVoteIn
〈5〉2. assume new b2 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1), ∀m ∈ S : m.maxVBal ≤ b2,
new m2 ∈ S , m2.maxVBal = b2, m2.maxVal = v prove SafeAt(v , b)
〈6〉. suffices assume new b3 ∈ 0 . . (b − 1)
prove ∃Q2 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q2 : VotedForIn(a, v , b3) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b3)by def SafeAt
〈6〉1. case b3 ∈ 0 . . (b2 − 1)by 〈5〉2, 〈6〉1, VotedInv def SafeAt , MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈6〉2. case b3 = b2
〈7〉1. VotedForIn(m2.acc, v , b2)by 〈5〉2 def MsgInv
〈7〉2. ∀ a2 ∈ Q , w ∈ V : VotedForIn(a2, w , b2)⇒ w = v
by 〈7〉1, VotedOnce, QuorumAssumption def TypeOK , Messages
〈7〉. qed by 〈4〉2, 〈6〉2, 〈7〉2 def WontVoteIn
〈6〉3. case b3 ∈ (b2 + 1) . . (b − 1)by 〈4〉2, 〈5〉2, 〈6〉3 def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages , WontVoteIn
〈6〉. qed by 〈6〉1, 〈6〉2, 〈6〉3
〈5〉. qed by 〈4〉2, 〈5〉1, 〈5〉2
〈4〉7. (∀m ∈ sent : m.type = “2a” ⇒ SafeAt(m.val , m.bal))′
by 〈4〉3, 〈4〉6, SafeAtStable def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈4〉. qed by 〈4〉3, 〈4〉4, 〈4〉5, 〈4〉7, ∀m ∈ sent ′ \ sent : m.type 6= “1b” def MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈3〉4. assume new a ∈ A, Phase2b(a) prove MsgInv ′
〈4〉. pick m ∈ sent : Phase2b(a)!(m) by 〈3〉4 def Phase2b
〈4〉1. ∀ a2, v2, b2 : VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)⇒ VotedForIn(a2, v2, b2)′ by def VotedForIn, Send
〈4〉2. ∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀ v ∈ V , b2 ∈ (m2.maxVBal + 1) . . (m2.bal − 1) :
¬VotedForIn(m2.acc, v , b2)⇒ ¬VotedForIn(m2.acc, v , b2)′
by def Send , VotedForIn, MsgInv , TypeOK , Messages
〈4〉. qed by 〈2〉1, 〈4〉1, 〈4〉2, SafeAtStable def MsgInv , Send , TypeOK , Messages
〈3〉. qed by 〈3〉1, 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3, 〈3〉4 def Next
〈2〉. qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2 def Inv
〈1〉. qed by 〈1〉1, 〈1〉2, PTL def Spec
Agreement asserts that Spec implies that Agree always holds.
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theorem Agreement , Spec ⇒ ✷Agree
〈1〉. use def B
〈1〉1. Inv ⇒ Agree
〈2〉. suffices assume Inv , new v1 ∈ V , new v2 ∈ V , new b1 ∈ B, new b2 ∈ B,
ChosenIn(v1, b1), ChosenIn(v2, b2), b1 ≤ b2
prove v1 = v2 by def Agree, Chosen
〈2〉1. case b1 = b2by 〈2〉1, VotedOnce, QuorumAssumption, SMTT(100) def ChosenIn, Inv
〈2〉2. case b1 < b2
〈3〉1. SafeAt(v2, b2)by VotedInv , QuorumAssumption def ChosenIn, Inv
〈3〉2. pick Q1 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q1 : VotedForIn(a, v2, b1) ∨WontVoteIn(a, b1)by 〈2〉2, 〈3〉1 def SafeAt
〈3〉3. pick Q2 ∈ Q : ∀ a ∈ Q2 : VotedForIn(a, v1, b1)by def ChosenIn
〈3〉4. qed by 〈3〉2, 〈3〉3, QuorumAssumption, VotedOnce, Z3 def WontVoteIn, Inv
〈2〉. qed by 〈2〉1, 〈2〉2
〈1〉. qed by 〈1〉1, Invariant , PTL
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D TLA+ specification of Multi-Paxos with Preemption
module MultiPaxosPreemptionSpec
This is a specification in TLA+ of Multi-Paxos with Preemption.
extends Integers , TLAPS
constants P , A, Q, V Sets of proposers, acceptors, quorums of acceptors, and values to propose
variables sent Set of sent messages
assume QuorumAssumption , Q ⊆ subset A∧ ∀Q1, Q2 ∈ Q : Q1 ∩Q2 6= ∅
B , N Set of ballots
S , N Set of slots
vars , 〈sent〉
Send(m) , sent ′ = sent ∪m
None , choose v : v /∈ V
Phase 1a: A 1a message with ballot b is sent by some proposer (to all processes).
Phase1a(p) , ∃ b ∈ B :
∧ ∨ ∄m ∈ sent : m.type = “preempt” ∧m.to = p
∨ ∃m ∈ sent : ∧m.type = “preempt” ∧m.to = p ∧ b > m.bal
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “1a” ∧m2.from = p ⇒ m.bal > m2.bal
∧ Send({[type 7→ “1a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ b]})
Phase 1b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 1a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than the highest it
has seen, a sends a 1b message with m.bal alongwith the highest-numbered pair it has voted for.
sent1b2b(a) , {m ∈ sent : m.type ∈ {“1b”, “2b”} ∧m.from = a}
PartialBmax (T ) , {t ∈ T : ∀ t1 ∈ T : t .slot = t1.slot ⇒ t .bal ≥ t1.bal}
voteds(a) , {[bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ m.slot , val 7→ m.val ] : m ∈ {m ∈ sent : m.type = “2b” ∧m.from = a}}
Phase1b(a) , ∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “1a”
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent1b2b(a) : m.bal > m2.bal
∧ Send({[type 7→ “1b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , voted 7→ PartialBmax (voteds(a))]})
Phase 2a: If there is no 2a message in sent with ballot b, and a quorum of acceptors has sent a set S of 1b
messages with ballot b, a proposer sends a 2a message with ballot b and value v , where v is the value with
the highest ballot in S , or is any value in V if no acceptor that responded in S has voted for anything.
Bmax (T ) , {[slot 7→ t .slot , val 7→ t .val ] : t ∈ PartialBmax (T )}
FreeSlots(T ) , {s ∈ Slots : ∄ t ∈ T : t .slot = s}
NewProposals(T ) , choose D ⊆ [slot : FreeSlots(T ), val : V ] : ∀ d1, d2 ∈ D : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2
ProposeDecrees(T ) , Bmax (T ) ∪ NewProposals(T )
VS (S , Q) , union {m.voted : m ∈ {m ∈ S : m.from ∈ Q}}
Phase2a(p) , ∃ b ∈ B :
∧ ∄m ∈ sent : (m.type = “2a”) ∧ (m.bal = b)
∧ ∃Q ∈ Q, S ∈ subset {m ∈ sent : (m.type = “1b”) ∧ (m.bal = b)} :
∧ ∀ a ∈ Q : ∃m ∈ S : m.from = a
∧ Send({[type 7→ “2a”, from 7→ p, bal 7→ b, decrees 7→ ProposeDecrees(VS (S , Q))]})
Phase 2b: For an acceptor a, if there is a 2a message m with ballot m.bal that is higher than or equal to the
highest it has seen, a sends a 2b message with m.bal and m.val .
Phase2b(a) , ∃m ∈ sent :
∧m.type = “2a”
∧ ∀m2 ∈ sent1b2b(a) : m.bal ≥ m2.bal
∧ Send({[type 7→ “2b”, from 7→ a, bal 7→ m.bal , slot 7→ d .slot , val 7→ d .val ] : d ∈ m.decrees})
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Preempt(a) , ∃m ∈ sent , m2 ∈ sent1b2b(a) :
∧m.type ∈ {“1a”, “2a”}
∧m2.bal > m.bal
∧ ∀m3 ∈ sent1b2b(a) : m2.bal ≥ m3.bal
∧ Send({[type 7→ “preempt”, to 7→ m.from, bal 7→ m2.bal ]})
Init , sent = ∅
Next , ∨ ∃ b ∈ B : Phase1a(b) ∨ Phase2a(b)
∨ ∃ a ∈ A : Phase1b(a) ∨ Phase2b(a) ∨ Preempt(a)
Spec , Init ∧ ✷[Next ]vars
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E Comparison of Multi-Paxos Invariants
Fig. 13 compares the message invariants used by Chand et al.’s [4] and our proof. For
brevity we change variable names for Chand et al.’s proof—(1) acceptorVoted to aVoted , (2)
acceptorMaxBal to aBal , and (3) MaxVotedBallotInSlot to MaxBalInSlot . The invariants
we derive for Multi-Paxos and Multi-Paxos with Preemption are the same.
Chand et al.’s proof [4] Our proof
Type
Invariants
(I16) sent ⊆ Messages sent ⊆ Messages
(I17) aVoted ∈ [A→subset[bal :B, slot :S, val :V]]
(I18) aBal ∈ [A → B ∪ {−1}]
Process
Invariants
∀a∈A
(I19) ∀ r ∈ aVoted [a] : aBal [a] ≥ r .bal
(I20) aBal [a] = −1⇒ aVoted [a] = ∅
(I21) ∀ r ∈ aVoted [a] :
VotedForIn(a, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)
(I22) ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V :
c > MaxBalInSlot(aVoted [a], s) ⇒
¬VotedForIn(a, b, s, v)
(I23)
∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : VotedForIn(a, b, s, v) ⇒
∃ r ∈ aVoted [a] : r .slot = s ∧ r .bal ≥ b
Message
Invariants
∀m∈sent
(I24) m.type= “2b”⇒m.bal≤aBal [m.from]
(I25) m.type= “1b”⇒m.bal≤aBal [m.from]
(I26) m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀ s ∈ S,
b ∈ 0..m.bal − 1, v ∈ V :
VotedForIn(m.from, b, s, v) ⇒
∃ r ∈m.voted :r .slot=s∧r .bal≥b
(I27) m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀ b ∈ B, s ∈ S, v ∈ V : m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀ r ∈ m.voted :
b ∈ MaxBalInSlot(m.voted , s) + 1..m.bal − 1⇒ ∀ b ∈ r .bal + 1..m.bal − 1, v ∈ V :
¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, s, v) ¬VotedForIn(m.from, b, r .slot , v)
(I28) m.type = “1b” ⇒ ∀ r ∈ m.voted :
VotedForIn(m.from, r .bal , r .slot , r .val)
(I29) m.type = “2a” ⇒ ∀ d ∈ m.decrees : SafeAt(d .bal , d .slot , d .val)
(I30) ∀ d1, d2 ∈ m.decrees : d1.slot = d2.slot ⇒ d1 = d2
(I31) m.type = “2a” ⇒ ∀m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “2a” ∧ m2.bal = m.bal ⇒
m2 = m
(I32) m.type = “2b” ⇒ ∃m2 ∈ sent : m2.type = “2a” ∧m2.bal = m.bal ∧
∃ d ∈ m2.decrees : d .slot = m.slot ∧ d .val = m.val
Figure 13: Comparison of invariants for Multi-Paxos. Our proof does not need (I17)-(I25),
and needs only (I16), an additional (I26), a simpler (I27), and (I28)-(I32).
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F Phase 2a and unique ballots
The first conjunct of Phase2a, shown in Fig. 3, states that no 2a message has been sent with
the same ballot on which Phase2a is being executed. To understand why the algorithm is
unsafe without this conjunct, consider a system with 3 processes, {P1,P2,P3}, where each
process is both an acceptor and a proposer. Assume that the first conjunct of Phase2a is
omitted. Assume that each majority is considered a quorum. Consider the following run:
1. P1 executes Phase 1a on some ballot b and sends a 1a message.
2. P1 and P2 receive the 1a message sent in step (1), execute Phase 1b, and send 1b
messages with maxVBal as −1 and maxVal as ⊥.
3. P1 receives the two 1b messages sent in step (2), executes Phase 2a on ballot b, and
send a 2a with proposed value v1. Note that because maxVBal of both 1b messages
was −1, v1 is a random value.
4. P1 and P2 receive the 2a message sent in step (3), execute Phase 2b, and send 2b
messages with ballot b and value v1. With two such 2b messages, Chosen(v1) holds.
5. P3 receives the 1a message sent in step (1), executes Phase 1b, and sends a 1b message
with maxVBal as −1 and maxVal as ⊥.
6. P1 receives the 1b message sent in step (5), uses also a previously received 1b message
sent in step (2), executes Phase 2a again on ballot b (allowed after removing the first
conjunct in Phase2a), and send a 2a with proposed value v2. Again, because maxVBal
of both 1b messages was −1, v2 is a random value, which can be different from v1.
7. P1 and P3 receive the 2a message sent in step (6), execute Phase 2b, and send 2b
messages with ballot b and value v2. With two such 2b messages, Chosen(v2) holds.
Because v1 and v2 may be two different random values, Agreement does not hold. That is,
the algorithm without the first conjunct in Phase2a is unsafe.
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